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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This an appeal from the final order of the Third Judi-
cial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy, granting respondent's motion to dismiss petitioner's 
appeal and affirming the final determination of the Executive 
Director of the Department of Health. This Court has jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a), since this is an 
appeal from a district court review of an adjudicative proceeding 
before a state agency. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is interest awardable under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-1 where the principal sum due by contract is resolved by 
the parties without entry of a formal judgment? 
2. Is petitioner entitled to interest under the Utah 
Prompt Payment Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-6-1, et seq.), under the 
facts of this case? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the times relevant to this appeal, VALI CONVALESCENT 
Sc CARE INSTITUTIONS ("VALI") was the owner and operator of nurs-
ing homes that provided nursing home services to Medicaid recipi-
ents within the State of Utah. Respondent Utah Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing ("DOH") is a department 
of Utah state government and is charged with the duty of making 
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determinations of payments to be made to Medicaid providers for 
nursing home services provided to Medicaid recipients. 
In January of 19 80, VALI submitted certain Facility 
Cost Profiles ("FCP's") to DOH for reimbursement of funds 
expended in providing care to Medicaid recipients. Subsequent to 
the filing of these FCP's, and at the request of DOH, the Bureau 
of Medicaid Fraud undertook a criminal investigation of VALI 
based upon alleged fraud committed in the FCP's. Partial payment 
for services rendered was made to VALI during the pendency of 
that investigation. In April of 1982, the Bureau of Medicaid 
Fraud terminated its investigation of VALI with no criminal 
charges being filed or any sanctions being imposed. 
Pursuant to the provisions of DOH's administrative 
hearing procedures for Medicaid recipients and providers, an exit 
conference and informal hearings were held in 1984, which were 
intended to make determinations of what funds were due to VALI on 
the basis of the FCP's. VALI did not raise the issue of its 
entitlement to interest on the funds due during these conferences 
and formal hearings, as it intended to raise that issue at a for-
mal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. As a result of 
the informal hearings and conferences, a determination was made 
that VALI was entitled to the principal sum of $272,362.03. It 
was agreed between VALI and DOH that this amount covered only the 
items that were raised at the conferences and informal hearings. 
It was further specifically agreed between VALI and DOH that the 
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issue of interest had neither been raised nor discussed at the 
conferences and informal hearings. 
A formal hearing was held on July 23, 1985 before David 
L. Stott, Administrative Law Judge. The sole issue for determi-
nation was whether VALI had settled or compromised its claim for 
interest. Following this hearing, the ALJ issued his decision, 
finding that VALI was entitled to interest, and stating: 
"Respondent should pay the claimant interest and ought to do so 
.-/ithout further delays." 
On or about April 18, 1986, the Executive Director of 
the Department of Health issued a decision that adopted the ALJ's 
factual findings but set aside his legal conclusions, denying 
that VALI was entitled to interest on its claim. On or about May 
13, 1986, VALI filed a petition in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, appealing the decision of the Execu-
tive Director. On or about July 29, 1986, respondent filed a 
motion seeking to affirm the final determination of the Executive 
Director and to dismiss VALI's petition. Following numerous 
briefings and one hearing before the court on December 4, 1987, 
Judge Murphy issued a Memorandum Decision, dated February 11, 
1988, in which he resolved the majority of the issues existing 
between the parties. 
With respect to VALIfs claims, the court found that 
VALI was not entitled to interest on the principal contractual 
obligation under either the Utah Procurement Code (Utah Code Ann. 
-3-
§§ 63-56-1, et seq,), or the Utah Prompt Payment Act (Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 15-6-1, et. seq. ) . With respect to respondent's defenses, 
the court found that the federal nature of the Medicaid program 
did not absolve DOH's responsibilities imposed by Utah law, that 
the inapplicability of the procurement code did not preempt the 
applicability of general principles of "pre-judgment interest" 
under Utah law, and that VALI was not precluded from seeking 
interest by either accord and satisfaction or waiver. Judge 
:iurphy specified in his Memorandum Decision that a single issue 
remained, which was framed in that decision as "whether the prin-
ciple of pre-judgment interest is applicable when there has been 
a resolution which avoids formal litigation." 
Both parties provided additional briefs to the court on 
that issue, and the court rendered its decision by Minute Entry 
on May 11, 1988, granting respondent's Motion to Dismiss and 
affirming the determination of the Executive Director of the 
Department of Health. Final judgment was entered on June 7, 
1988, and VALI filed a Notice of Appeal from that decision on 
July 6, 1988. Respondent filed its own Notice of Appeal on July 
22, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At all relevant times, VALI owned and operated 
nursing homes which provided services to State Medicaid recipi-
ents for the period January 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979. In 
-4-
1978, VALI entered into an agreement with the Utah State Depart-
ment of Social Services for each of four VALI centers to provide 
nursing home care to State recipients. Section A-2 of the con-
tract provides that the State will: 
Process payments to the provider within a 
reasonable time, after receipt of an itemized 
form 271-A for services rendered the previous 
month. Payment shall be made in accordance 
with the allowable costs reimbursement manual 
for nursing facilitiesf and shall not exceed 
amounts paid by the general public for such 
services. All payments subject to reasonable 
cost audit and adjustment. (Emphasis added). 
As can be seen, the contract does not set forth specific services 
or specific prices. Instead, it was agreed that the provider 
would submit itemized statements, with fees for services, based 
on the allowable cost reimbursement manual and subject to the 
State audit process. Utah State Dept. of Social Services Nursing 
Facility Provider Agreement. 
2. In January, 1980, VALI submitted Facility Cost 
Profiles ("FCP's") to the DOH that specified the services pro-
vided by VALI for the period January 1, 1978 through June 30, 
1979 and the fees for those services. (Stipulation of Facts f 1; 
Findings and Conclusions of Administrative Law Judge 1F 1, p. 3). 
1
 A Stipulation of Facts was executed by the parties hereto in 
connection with the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. 
A copy of said Stipulation (hereinafter cited as "Stip.") is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A. " Similarly, the findings and con-
clusions of the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ Find-
ings") are attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
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3. Under normal circumstances state audits would have 
been completed, conferences and hearings would have been 
arranged, and payment made to VALI by July 1, 1980. Memorandum 
2 in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petition, p. 3. 
4. Rather than beginning this process, however, the 
state forwarded the FCP' s to the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud and, in 
the Fall of 1980, the Bureau initiated an investigation that 
lasted approximately two and a half years. At the conclusion of 
the investigation, in April, 1982, the Bureau stated that there 
was no evidence to support any charges that VALI had filed false 
or inaccurate FCP's. VALI's claim for payment was reinstated. 
(Stip. 1T 2; ALJ Findings H 1, p.3). 
5. During the investigation by the Bureau of Medicaid 
Fraud, virtually every business document VALI possessed was 
seized by search warrant. At the conclusion of the investiga-
tion, only part of VALI' s business records were returned, and 
those that were returned were in such disarray as to be virtually 
worthless without a major effort at reconstruction by VALI. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 2). 
6. During the period from April, 1982, when the 
Bureau issued its decision, through March, 1985, the State 
1
 This fact was set forth in VALI's Memorandum opposing the 
DOH's Motion to Dismiss its petition in the trial court without 
record citation, but also without objection by the DOH. 
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conducted a series of informal hearings and conferences as part 
of its cost audit process. The issue of interest on the princi-
pal sum found to be due and owing by the DHCF was not addressed 
at the conferences and informal hearings. (Stip. H 12; ALJ Find-
ings irir 1, 3, pp. 4, 5). 
7. The DOH issued a decision on March 18, 1985 after 
an informal hearing, which stated, in part: 
Both parties reserve the right to raise any 
of the issues discussed in this hearing or 
any related issues not necessarily discussed 
at the informal hearing level if the conflict 
cannot be resolved at the administrative 
review level. 
(Stip. 1f1f 11, 13 and Ex. H thereto). 
8. A supplemental decision, evidenced by a DOH letter 
dated March 25, 1985, contained the same reservation of rights as 
noted above. (Stip. f 14 and Exs. I and J thereto). 
9. During the exit conferences and informal hearings, 
VALI intentionally did not raise the issue of whether DOH should 
pay interest on amounts found due and owing. VALI intended to 
raise the interest issue at a formal hearing before an Adminis-
trative Law Judge. (ALJ Findings ITf 1-3, pp. 3-5). 
10. A determination was made that VALI was entitled to 
the principal sum of $272,362.03, as a result of the informal 
hearings and conferences. (Stip. 1T 17 and Ex. N thereto). 
11. At approximately the same time, the State submit-
ted a proposed mutual release to VALI that would have released 
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i:he State from any claim that VALI might have for interest. 
(Stip. if 18 and Ex. N thereto). VALI refused to execute such a 
release. (Transcript, pp. 7 5, 78). 
12. A meeting was held at the DHCF offices on May 13, 
1985. Participants included the DHCF acting director, an infor-
mal hearing officer, an audit manager, a State Assistant Attorney 
General, the owner of VALI and counsel for VALI. (Stip. 1f 20). 
At that meeting, VALI informed the DHCF that the issue of inter-
est had not been settled by the informal hearings. All parties 
agreed that the question of interest was never raised nor argued 
as an identifiable issue during the informal hearings. (Stip. 
IT 21) . 
13. On or about May 16, 1985, VALI cashed a state war-
rant in the amount of $272,362.03. (Stip. 11 24). A letter 
accompanying the warrant stated that the sum represented "full 
settlement of all claims and demands arising from informal hear-
ings conducted . . . on February 28, 1985 and March 20, 1985." 
(Stip. 1T 23 and Ex. R thereto.) 
14. Subsequently, VALI made a timely request for a 
formal hearing, at which the single issue would be whether VALI 
was entitled to interest on the principal sum paid. (Stip. 
f 25) . 
15. After evidence was received at the formal hearing, 
the Administrative Law Judge found in favor of VALI and stated in 
his written opinion: 
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There is nothing complex or mysterious about 
it. Respondent should pay the claimant 
interest and ought to do so without further 
delays. 
(ALJ Findings, p. 7). 
16. The Executive Director of the Department of 
Health, without: having heard the evidence, overturned that deci-
sion and denied VALI any interest on the sum of money previously 
paid. DOH "Final Determination," dated April 18, 1986. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under the common law of the State of Utah, a creditor 
is entitled to interest "on debts overdue." Utah Code Annotated 
§ 15-1-1 establishes the rate of interest applicable for the 
"forebearance of money." Nothing in either the statute or the 
common law would limit recovery of such interest only to situa-
tions in which the principal amount has been awarded pursuant to 
a formal judgment. In fact, such a limitation would be contrary 
to the well established principle that "settlements are favored 
in the law." Since DOH retained money that was owed to VALI, it 
must pay interest on the amount so retained, despite the fact 
that the principal was paid in settlement. In any event, VALI is 
entitled to interest under the Utah Prompt Payment Act, which 
requires state agencies to pay obligations owing on contracts 
within 60 days of their receipt of an invoice. DOH claims that 
the Prompt Payment Act is inapplicable to this case because the 
delay resulted from a "dispute." In fact, as the ALJ found, 
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there vas no real dispute in this case, and DOH should be 
required to pay interest. Moreover, interpretation of the Prompt 
Payment Act dispute provision in the manner suggested by DOH 
would effectively nullify the entire Act, since state agencies 
could avoid the Act's effect in every instance by simply disput-
ing legitimate claimed charges. 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1 AND THE COMMON 
LAW OF UTAH, VALI IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
INTEREST ON AMOUNTS PAST DUE. 
VALI's claim of entitlement to interest on the princi-
pal sum paid by DOH in this case is founded on both statute and 
Utah common law. In Utah, the statutory rate of interest, as of 
the dates of the parties' contracts, was as follows: 
The legal rate of interest for the loan 
or forbearance of any money, goods or things 
in action shall be six per cent per annum. 
But nothing herein contained shall be so 
construed as to in any way affect any penalty 
or interest charge, which by law applies to 
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract 
or obligations made before the 14th day of 
May, 1907. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1953). This provision establishes the 
legal rate of interest applicable to payments required by con-
tracts that do not themselves specify an applicable rate. In 
reliance upon § 15-1-1, the Utah Supreme Court has held that, "In 
contract cases, certainly, interest on amounts found to be due in 
judicial proceedings is recovery to which the creditor is enti-
tled as a matter of law." Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 
(Utah 1979). See also, SCM Land Company v. Watkins & Faber, 732 
P.2d 105 (Utah 1986) . 
Thus, VALI has a statutory right to recover interest on 
the principal sums paid to it by DOH under the terms of the 
parties' contracts. Even in the absence of a statute, however, 
purely equitable principles would mandate the same result. For 
example, in Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Company, 233 Kan. 544, 664 P.2d 
1335, 1343 (1983), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985), the Supreme 
Court of Kansas stated that, "Where a party retains and makes 
actual use of money belonging to another, however, equitable 
principles require it to pay interest on the monies so retained 
and used." The Supreme Court of Utah in Jack B. Parson Construc-
tion Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976), while not specifying 
the basis for its decision in that case, awarded interest against 
J
 The rate of interest provided by Section 15-1-1 was changed 
by the legislature to 8 percent in 1981, and to 10 percent in 
1985. VALI contends that the interest to which it is entitled 
during the relevant time periods should be measured at the legal 
rates then in effect. 
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the State of Utah on a contractual obligation, and is consistent 
with both the statute and the equitable principle described in 
Holmes. 
In any event, it has long been the case, under Utah 
common law, that interest is allowable non debts overdue." In 
1890, well before § 15-1-1 had been enacted, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated as follows: 
At common law, no interest was allowed on 
debts overdue, unless there was an express or 
implied contract to pay interest. 
• * * 
This rule of the common law does not obtain 
in America, and interest is allowed on debts 
overdue even if there is no statute providing 
for interest. And the question has been 
settled in this territory in favor of the 
allowance of interest on debts overdue. 
Wasatch Mineral Company v. Crescent Mineral Company, 24 P. 586, 
587 (Utah 1890) (citations omitted). 
There remains for discussion, however, the lower 
court's concern that "pre-judgment interest" may not be available 
where the parties have resolved the payment of principal without 
entry of a judgment. This concern was based, in large part, upon 
references to "pre-judgment interest" contained in Jack B. 
Parson, supra, and indeed, in many other interest cases as well. 
Such references are misleading to the extent that they imply that 
interest on obligations is only available where a judgment has 
been rendered. They are simply terms of convenience, used to 
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refer to the time period during which the interest runs—from the 
aate payment is due to the date of judgment. At that point, the 
principal and interest is either paid, thereby ending the inter-
est obligation, or the interest is added to the principal to form 
the total judgment amount, to which the judgment rate of interest 
is then applicable. 
A more accurate term would perhaps be "prepayment" or 
"pre-resolution" interest, since it is only the act of payment of 
principal which is significant, as the payment of principal stops 
the running of interest at the "legal rate." The only signifi-
cance of entry of a judgment is that the party to be paid obtains 
the additional benefit of "judgment interest," which is, in 
effect, compound interest. However, nothing in § 15-1-1 in any 
way limits its applicability to situations in which a judgment 
for principal is entered, nor do the cases applying equitable 
principles in any way suggest that entitlement to interest is 
dependent upon the entry of a judgment. In fact, only judgment 
interest (Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4) is expressly made dependent 
upon the existence of a judgment. The absence of such a limita-
tion in § 15-1-1 creates an inference that none exists. 
4
 Section 15-1-4 specifically provides for interest to be paid 
on "judgments," which interest runs from the date of judgment 
until the obligation has been paid. In contrast, § 15-1-1/ upon 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Logic alone would also dictate that petitioner's 
entitlement to interest in this case should not d€?pend upon the 
existence or nonexistence of a judgment for principal. Interest 
is payable for the forbearance of money, which exists whenever 
the principal obligation is not timely paid, whether it is 
ultimately reduced to judgment or is paid pursuant to a settle-
ment by mutual agreement. The only issue is the time at which 
the running of interest ceases. Where the principal is paid 
prior to entry of a judgment, such as by virtue of a settlement, 
the fornearance is necessarily shortened, and the interest 
payable is consequently less. However, the entitlement to 
interest does not change. 
In the relatively few cases that have considered claims 
for interest subsequent to payment of principal, the issue has 
invariably been whether the party seeking payment waived its 
entitlement to interest by acceptance of principal, rather than 
wnether entitlement to interest is dependent upon the entry of a 
judgment. One such case, United States v. Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York, Inc., 590 F.Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
which petitioner relies, makes no reference whatsoever to the 
existence of a judgment, and the interest provided therein runs 
from the date on which the obligation of payment was due, until 
either payment is made, at which point the interest obligation 
ceases, or judgment is entered, at which point, § 15-1-4 becomes 
applicable. 
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contains a discussion of this issue which is equally applicable 
to the facts of the present case. In that case, the United 
States Postal Service ("USPS"), had been overcharged for its 
electricity by Con Ed for a period of approximately five years. 
After the error was discovered, Con Ed tendered USPS a check in 
the amount of the overcharge, but refused its demand for interest 
on that amount. USPS negotiated the check, with an endorsement 
that read, "Negotiation of this check is not to be construed as a 
waiver of U.S. Postal Service's claim for interest payments," and 
additionally, sent Con Ed a letter notifying it that the payment 
had been accepted under protest. 
USPS subsequently instituted a lawsuit for recovery of 
interest on the overpayment, at the legal rate as provided by 
statute. In finding that the acceptance by USPS of principal did 
not preclude it from seeking interest in a subsequent lawsuit, 
the Court relied upon Girard Trust Company v. United States, 270 
U.S. 163, 168 (1926), which contains the following language: 
In this case, there is statutory provision 
for it [interest], and it is analogous to a 
suit in debt or covenant in which the con-
tract specifically provides for payment of 
interest on the principal debt. In such 
cases, the authorities all hold that the 
acceptance of the payment of the principal 
debt does not preclude a further suit for the 
interest unpaid. And the same rule obtains 
where the obligation is one that by statute 
bears interest. 
The Con Ed court additionally noted that USPS would have been 
entitled to interest if it had sued for the principal amount, 
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since New York provides by statute for the recovery of interest 
"upon a sum awarded because of a breach of performance of con-
tract." N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 5001 (McKinney 1963) (emphasis 
added). Under these circumstances, the court neld that USPS was 
entitled to recover interest on the principal sum, although it 
had been paid voluntarily, stating: 
Indeed, common sense dictates that result. 
Con Ed, the party at fault for the error in 
billing, should not be allowed to avoid the 
plaintiff's claim for accrued interest, which 
the plaintiff specifically reserved by both 
its endorsement of the check and its letter 
acknowledging receipt of the check, by 
putting plaintiff to the Hobson's choice of 
accepting the refund without interest, or 
waiting months, or more likely years, to 
recover the principal plus interest in a 
lawsuit. In this case, the litigants are 
giants—the United States Postal Service and 
a large public utility. In another case, 
however, it may be an average consumer of 
modest means, who under tne defendant's 
theory could be forced to forego the right to 
interest in order to receive a prompt refund 
of an overcharge admittedly due him or her. 
590 F.Supp. at 270 (emphasis added). 
Common sense compels the same result in the present 
case. DOH should not be allowed to avoid paying interest to 
which VALI is legitimately entitled, by the mere fact that the 
parties ultimately agreed to the payment of principal (some seven 
years after petitioner had rendered the services upon which its 
claims were based), rather than refusing to agree and taking the 
entirety of the issues to final judgment. It is well settled in 
the State of Utah that, 'The law generally encourages 
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settlements," Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 681 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1984), and that, "The law has no 
interest in compelling all disputes to be resolved by litiga-
tion. " Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 613 (Utah 1983). The reason 
that, "Settlements are favored in the law, and should be encour-
aged, [is] because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to 
the parties, but also to the judicial system. Tracy-Collins Bank 
& Trust Company v. Travelstead, 529 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979). 
The lower court's ruling denying VALI interest in this case, on 
the ground that it settled the issue of principal with DOH rather 
than taking the entire matter through litigation to a final 
judgment, flies in the face of this well settled precedent, and 
unfairly denies VALI the interest to which it is legally 
entitled. 
II. THE UTAH PROMPT PAYMENT ACT (UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 15-6-1, et sec[.) IS APPLICABLE TO VALI' S 
CLAIM AGAINST THE DOH. 
The Utah Prompt Payment Act (§§ 15-6-1, et seq. ) 
applies to all state agencies and requires them to pay for 
services rendered pursuant to contracts within 60 days following 
their receipt of an invoice. Utah Code Ann. § 15-6-2. The Act 
further provides for payment of interest on amounts overdue, as 
follows: 
(1) Interest shall accrue and be 
charged on payments overdue under 
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Section 15-6-2 at the rate of 15.5% per annum 
beginning on the day after payment is due, if 
the payment due date is specified by con-
tract, or on the 61st day after receipt of 
the invoice, if no payment date is specified 
by contract. Interest ceases to accrue* on 
the date payment is made. 
(2) Any interest which remains unpaid 
at the end of any 6 0-day period or which 
remains unpaid at the end of any specified 
period provided by contract shall be added to 
the principal amount of the debt and shall 
thereafter accumulate interest. 
Under § 15-6-3, DHCF is required to pay interest on overdue 
obligations. Here DHCF contends it has no interest obligation 
under the Act because, under § 15-6-4, if the agency's failure to 
timely pay interest is the result of a "dispute" between the 
agency and the business over the amount due, the interest provi-
sion is not applicable. The State misplaces its reliance on the 
dispute provision. Here the amount constituting the principal 
sum resulted, not from a dispute between the parties, but from 
the State audit process which always occurs under the State 
Medicaid program. 
The DOH's only evidence on this issue was the simple 
assertion by it that it "contested" VALIfs claim. Indeed, the 
DOH was responsible for an investigation that was terminated 
without any finding of bad conduct on VALI's part, but which did 
seriously hamper VALI's efforts to provide detailed evidence of 
its claims, as it was required to do by its contract. What the 
DOH did was to take advantage of the burden that it had caused to 
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be placed on VALI in significantly delaying payment. The only 
tribunal in which the evidence has been heard found that there 
was no legitimate dispute, and that ruling should be given 
effect. 
Moreover, by the terms of the parties' own contract, 
"all payments [are] subject to reasonable cost audit and adjust-
ment." This cost audit and adjustment procedure was precisely 
the procedure in which the parties engaged and that resulted in 
the ultimate "settlement" of VALI's claim. Under DOH's theory, 
this procedure automatically constitutes a "dispute," and 
§ 15-6-3 has been overridden by the terms of the contract, 
drafted by DOH, under which VALI's claim arises. Such an 
interpretation is clearly unreasonable, as has already been 
determined by the ALJ. 
In this case, the informal hearings and conferences 
were held to explain and document VALI's claim, not to provide a 
forum for an adversarial dispute. The original contract did not 
list prices or services — the understanding of the parties was 
that VALI would submit its claims, noting prices and services, to 
be followed by an audit. Within a reasonable time the State 
would make payment to VALI. 
Thus, the purpose of the audit process is not to 
resolve a dispute but to check fees and services as against the 
cost reimbursement manual. The State's position that VALI and 
the State had a dispute is untenable. An interpretation of the 
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Prompt Payment Act's "dispute" provision such as the State 
suggests would mean that the State can take five to seven years 
to "audit" a claim but not be responsible lor interest on the 
amount ultimately found due. 
Application of the Prompt Payment Act's dispute provi-
sion to bar interest on the principal paid to VALI in this case 
would be unfair and contrary to a reasonable statutory interpre-
tation. VALI's claim for interest unquestionably falls within 
zhe Prompt Payment Act and the lower court's ruling granting 
DOH's motion to dismiss should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
VALI is entitled to interest on the amounts unpaid by 
the DOH under both the common and statutory law of the State of 
Utah. VALI was unjustifiably denied the use of money to which it 
was entitled, for a period of several years, and both common law 
and statutory principles require DOH to pay VALI for the use of 
its money during that time. Therefore, the lower court's judg-
ment denying VALI recovery of interest in this case should be 
reversed. 
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DATED this 29th day of December, 1988 
/ , n 
jtf tAjinrvl-
SPENCER E. AUSTIN 
JULIA/ C. ATTWOOD 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing OPENING 
3RIEF OF APPELLANT VALI CONVALESCENT AND CARE INSTITUTIONS to the 
following on this 29th day of December, 1988: 
Brian L. Farr 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
296:121288A 
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EXHIBITS 
Tab A 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (A0150) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
* * * * * * * 
VALI CONVALESCENT and 
CARE INSTITUTIONS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Civil No. 
* * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter is presently scheduled for 
formal hearing before the Honorable David Stott, Administrative 
Law Judge, on the 23rd day of July, 1985 at the hour of 9:00 
a.m. In an effort to simplify the formal hearing, the parties 
hereby stipulate to the following facts: 
1» The claimant filed Facility Cost Profiles 
("FCP's") for the time period January 1, 1978 through June 30, 
1978 and July 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979, with the Depart-
EXHIBIT A" 
ment of Health, Division of Health Care Financing ("DHCF") for 
funds expended as a Medicaid provider for nursing home ser-
vices. These FCP's's were filed in approximately January, 1980. 
2. The DHCF did not complete its adjustment of these 
FCP's's in 1980 due to an investigation that was being con-
ducted by the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud. That investigation was 
concluded on April 22, 1982 without the filing of any criminal 
charges. The decision not to file charges is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. 
3. Exit conferences were conducted regarding these 
FCP's's by the Division of Health Care Financing. The claimant 
was not satisfied with the results of the exit conferences and 
requested an informal hearing pursuant to the provisions of the 
Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid Recipients and 
Providers. 
4. An informal hearing was held on October 25, 1984, 
wherein a request was made of the DHCF to compute a total 
figure relating to the audit in question. 
5* The DHCF sent a letter to claimant on December 7, 
1984. That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
6. The Claimant sent a letter to the DHCF on Decem-
ber 26, 1984. That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
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7. The DHCF sent a letter to the claimant on Febru-
ary 15, 1985. That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
8. The claimant sent a letter to the DHCF on Febru-
ary 15, 1985, That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
9. The DHCF sent a letter to claimant on Febru-
ary 19, 1985. That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
10. Spencer E. Austin, counsel for claimant, sent a 
letter to Suzanne Dandoy, M.D., Director of the Department of 
Health* That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
11. The informal hearing was held on February 28, 
1985 before Steven Gatzmeier, a DHCF hearing officer. 
12. The issue of interest on any sums found due and 
owing by the DHCF was not addressed in any manner in the 
informal hearing. 
13. The decision of the informal hearing officer was 
issue on March 18, 1985 and is attached hereto as Exhibit H. 
14. TWo supplements to the decision of the informal 
hearing officer were issued on March 25, 1985 and March 27, 
1985 and are attached hereto as Exhibits I and J. 
15. The claimant sent a letter to the informal hear-
ing officer dated March 22, 1985. That letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit K. 
16. The claimant sent a letter to the DHCF on 
April 1, 1985. That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit L. 
-3-
17. The DHCF sent a letter to the claimant on 
April 3, 1985. That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit M. 
18. On or about April 4, 1985, counsel for the DHCF 
hand delivered a proposed Mutual Release to counsel for the 
claimant. That document is attached hereto as Exhibit N. 
19. The claimant sent a letter to the informal hear-
ing officer dated April 5, 1985. That letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 0. 
20. There was a meeting held at the office of the 
DHCF on May 13, 1985. In attendance were the following: 
A. Glen Blonquist - Acting Director of the 
Division of Health Care Financing 
B. Steven Gatzmeier - Informcil Hearing Officer 
C. Dennis Pettey - Audit Manager 
D. Clark C. Graves - Assistant Attorney General 
E. Richard A. Brown - Owner of Vali 
Convalescent and Care institutions 
F. James B. Lee - Counsel for Claimant 
G. Spencer E. Austin - Counsel for Claimant 
21. At the meeting made reference to in paragraph 20 
above, the DHCF. was informed by the claimant that, in his 
opinion, the issue of interest had not been settled by the 
informal hearing• The claimant was informed by representatives 
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of the DHCF that, in their opinion, the question of interest 
was settled by the informal hearing. 
All parties agreed that the question of interest 
was never raised nor argued as an identifiable issue during the 
informal hearing. 
22. On or about May 14, 1985, the document attached 
hereto as Exhibit P was transmitted from counsel for the DHCF 
to counsel for the claimant. 
23. The Claimant received a check for the sum of 
£274,223.17 on May 16, 1985 with an accompanying letter signed 
by Steven Gatzmeier. That check and the accompanying letter 
are attached hereto as Exhibits Q and R. 
24. On or about May 16, 1985, the claimant cashed the 
State Warrant attached hereto as Exhibit Q. 
25. A timely request for a Formal Hearing was made on 
May 21, 1985 pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative 
Hearing Procedures for Medicaid Recipients and Providers and 
was limited to the sole issue of whether interest is due and 
owing on the sum paid to the Claimant. 
DATED this^^r/day of L^j/o , 1985. 
^^^^A_^ 
CLARK C. GRAVES SPEj^ fER E. AUSTIS 
Assistant Attorney of and for 
General PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Claimant 
5948T 
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TabB 
IN THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
JALI CONVALESCENT and CARE ) 
INSTITUTIONS. ) 
) FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Claimant. ) OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
vs. ) CASE NO. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. ) 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE ) 
FINANCING ) 
Respondent. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on for formal hearing the 23rd 
day of July. 1985 at the hour of 9:00 A.M. before David L. Stott. 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ'1). Claimant was represented by Mr. 
Spencer Austin and Respondent by Mr. Clark Graves. It is the 
designated responsibility of the ALJ to hear Claimant's claim. 
Respondent's response and. thereupon, to make findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and recommendations for the consideration of the 
Executive Director of the Department of Health, who makes the 
ultimate disposition of the matter for the Department. 
At the outset of the hearing. Claimant's counsel raised a 
question about the fairness of the proceeding. He noted that the 
Respondent and the decision-maker in this case are one and the same, 
to wit: the Department of Health. The ALJ would only comment that 
the identity of Respondent and ultimate decision-maker will not 
affect the ALJ's independence and his determination of the merits of 
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Laimant's claim. Furthermore. the ALJ anticipates that the 
Kecutive Director, being a non-lawyer ,~~ would rely heavily upon the 
LJ ' s independent findings and conclusions in making his or her 
ecision. Finally, the ALJ would note that Complainant has available 
o it full appeal rights through the judicial system following 
•xhaustion of its administrative oportunities. 
At the hearing, a briefing schedule was established, 
subsequently extended and briefs were ultimately submitted by the 
parties. A second brief was submitted by Respondent. Mr. Graves of 
the Attorney General's Office determined to submit an affidavit 
setting forth facts related to the matter and. thereupon, withdrew 
as counsel for Respondent and was replaced by Mr. William C. Quigley. 
The sole issue presented to the ALJ. as stipulated by the 
parties, is whether or not the Claimant, Vali Convalescent and Care 
Institutions ("Vali"), has settled and compromised its claim for 
interest in connection with payments made by Respondent to Vali for 
health care services. 
Respondent takes the position that the parties effected a 
settlement of all issues including interest not later than April 5. 
1985, and that in any event the interest issue was lost to Claimant 
thereafter when Claimant cashed the State's warrant for the amount 
of principal agreed upon, because claims of interest, regardless of 
their merit, are lost once the principal amount has been settled and 
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paid. Claimant, obviously, takes a different view of the matter. 
Claimant argues that it at no time concluded the question nor 
conceded the issue of interest and is still fully entitled to 
reasonable interest on the principal amount paid to it; the ALJ 
agrees with Claimant. 
The facts of the case were stipulated by the parties and are 
adopted by the AL J • Said facts are contained in the Stipulation of 
Facts, which is a part of this record and does not need restatement 
here. 
DISCUSSION. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Facility Cost Profiles ('TCP's") submitted by Claimant 
to the Respondent in January, 1980 relate to services performed as 
far back as January, 1978. Claimant received payment of principal 
sums for his services in May. 1985 and. thus, waited more than seven 
years for payment of some services. The delay came about in part 
because of a two-year, three-month investigation of Claimant's FCP's 
by the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud--apparently at the request of 
Respondent. The Bureau concluded ultimately that it could not make a 
case against Claimant, Thereafter. Claimant was forced to 
reconstruct documentation, which had been damaged or lost in the 
aforesaid investigation, which delayed the matter further. Finally, 
in 1984 an exit conference and an informal hearing took place to 
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establish the amounts owed Claimant. Thereafter, however, there were 
still disputes about the amounts due Claimant and, therefore, 
additional informal hearing's were held. Although Claimant clearly-
stated its claim for interest prior to the informal hearings, it did 
not raise the claim during the informal hearings, determining, 
apparently, to get resolved the matter of principal before pursuing 
the interest claim. It wasn't until April 5, 1985, that Claimant 
could and did accord by letter with Respondent's offer of principal 
(subsequent payment of which included an amount of interest for the 
period April 5, 1985 to date of payment by warrant). 
2. I conclude that Claimant at no time considered that the 
matter of interest had been settled or compromised. By his letter of 
April 5, 1985, he agreed to accept $272,362.03 as the principal 
amount due him for health care services rendered. It was Claimant's 
apparent intent to get from Respondent the principal amount for 
which it had waited some seven years before taking up the matter of 
interest, which it had reason to believe would be disputed by 
Respondent. It appears that the Respondent attempted on at least one 
occasion to draw from Claimant a concession of the interest issue in 
Respondent's favor prior to payment of the principal. However, 
Claimant's response was at most ambiguous and a reflection of its 
apprehension that any firm assertions regarding interest would have 
further delayed payment of principal. Respondent had the use of 
Claimant's money for seven years and every equity which appears here 
would suggest that Respondent ought to pay Claimant compensation for 
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the use of its money. It appears that Respondent has chosen to focus 
solely on whether or not it can be compelled as a matter of law to 
pay interest on Claimant's money and ignore the demands of equity. 
The reason for that attitude is, unfortunately, not clear from this 
record. 
3. It is certainly true that the parties arrived at a 
settlement of the amount of principal to be paid Claimant on April 
5, 1985; Claimant could not now claim additional amounts of 
principal having raised all pertinent issues of principal at the 
informal hearings and having accepted the proffered amount of 
principal by its letter of April 5, 1985. Respondent is entitled to 
rely on the settlement of principal. Interest, however, is a 
different matter. The issue of interest was not raised at the 
informal hearings because Claimant apparently intended to deal with 
the issues of principal and interest separately and in order. Having 
resolved the issue of principal, it then—consistent with its 
position—rejected the release document prepared by the Respondent, 
because the release included a waiver of interest.' Thereafter, 
Claimant met with Respondent and manifest plainly that it wanted 
interest on the principal. Its meeting with Respondent was prior to 
the delivery of the warrant for the amount of principal. Respondent 
did not restrict endorsement on the warrant but allowed Claimant to 
cash the warrant on May 16, 1985 knowing full well that Claimant 
expected payment of interest on the principal sum. 
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4. As previously stated, Respondent has apparently determined 
:o ignore the equities in this case; however. I do not believe that 
the law supports 'Respondent's position either. Cox Construction 
:ompany, Inc. v. State Road Commission. 583 P.2d 85 (Utah 1978). 
sited by Respondent as authority for the proposition that Claimant's 
interest claim cannot now be allowed, is distinguishable from this 
case. In Cox the Court recites the general principal that where 
interest is payable merely as damages for nonpayment of money when 
due. acceptance of the principal amount bars any claim for interest, 
save, of course, where claimant has clearly preserved the issue of 
interest. In Cox the stipulations between the parties were 
completely silent on the subject of interest such that it appeared 
that the claimant in that case had decided to ask for interest as an 
afterthought. In this case the Respondent knew or should have known 
that Claimant was not stipulating to the release of interest claims. 
In this case Claimant made express claim for the interest prior to 
taking and cashing the warrant and made it plainly known that it was 
preserving the issue of interest for further determination. 
5. Beyond that, however, the Utah Procurement Code. Utah Code 
Ann. Section 63-56-1. fet seq.. effective July 1. 1980. appears to 
establish Claimant's claim: 
Interest on amounts ultimately determined to 
be due to a contractor or the state shall be 
payable at the rate applicable to judgments 
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from the date the claim arose through the 
date of decision or judgment, whichever is 
later (emphasis added). 
?his particular statutory passage—the interpretation of which 
:annot apparently be based on case law—appears to establish in 
Tlaimant an entitlement to interest on his claim for principal from 
:he time the claim arose through the date of decision. 
Here the Claimant was a contractor with the state. He was 
Dwed a substantial sum of money for seven years, the delay in 
payment being caused primarily by the actions of the state. Interest 
could not be applied until the amount of principal was established. 
Once the state had finally satisfied itself concerning the amount of 
principal owed to Claimant. Claimant was entitled to interest. The 
statute indicates that the rate of interest to be applied to the 
principal amount is that which is applicable to judgments. There is 
nothing complex or mysterious about it. Respondent should pay the 
Claimant interest and ought to do so without further delays. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW* JUDGE 
< i^ rJ^VC^sC'f DAVID L. STOTT 
